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ABSTRACT 
 
The study on which this article reports, analyzed the current situation of ownership structure and corporate 
performance based on the panel data of 153 companies listed on the Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) board from 
2010 to 2012 and explored the mechanism of companies’ ownership structure to corporate performance with 
multiple regressions. The results show that tradable shares, state-owned shares and managerial shares have a 
negative correlation with corporate performance, and that there is a significant quadratic non-linear relationship 
between tradable shares and corporate performance while legal-person shares are not significantly related to 
corporate performance. We also found that the shareholding ratio of the top ten largest shareholders has a 
significantly positive correlation with corporate performance but we failed to find any significance for the largest 
shareholder and the Z index. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
s a newly emerging force in Chinese capital markets, the GEM board has received a lot of attention. 
The GEM board of the Chinese stock market was set up in 2009, and by the end of 2013, a total of 
355 companies were listed on the board1. By the end of 2013, the total market value of the GEM 
board had risen to RMB 1.5 trillion, and there are more than 20 enterprises whose market values exceed billions of 
RMB2. Although the GEM board has not been considered as the leading player in the Chinese stock market, going 
public on the GEM board is becoming an important approach for the initial public offering (IPO) of growth 
enterprises, a breeding base for strategic emerging industries, and a financing platform for high- and new-tech 
enterprises, which have a significant influence on the Chinese structural transformation of the economy and 
upgrading of the industrial structure. 
 
Before going public, the majority of companies listed on the GEM board were family enterprises with concentrated 
equity3. Stock rights began to decentralize once listed and the separation of ownership and control resulted in a 
series of problems concerning ownership structure and corporate governance, e.g., agency problems (Du & Liu, 
2002). As a form of structural arrangement, ownership structure is an important part of corporate governance, which 
will ultimately influence corporate performance. Relatively little research has been conducted on ownership 
structure and the corporate performance of Chinese companies listed on the GEM board, with the majority of 
previous research focused on the main board and the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) board. However, the 
                                                
1 See Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) official website, http://www.szse.cn/main/chinext/ 
2 See China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database 
3 China Securities Times indicates that over eighty percent of listed companies on the GEM board are family controlled companies, see 
http://kuaixun.stcn.com/2013/0811/10668510.shtml 
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GEM board possesses its own characteristics and is different from the main and SME boards in many aspects, e.g. 
scale, industry distribution and ownership structure, thereby necessitating conducting a study regarding ownership 
structure and corporate performance of companies listed on the GEM board. Hence, the current study will not only 
enrich the relevant theory, but will also offer recommendations for good corporate governance practices, assist 
companies listed on the GEM board with their development and growth, and promote the development of a multi-
level capital market and optimize its structure. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
Ownership structure is defined along two dimensions, namely ownership mix and ownership concentration (Gursoy 
& Aydogan, 2002). The exploration of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has 
been the focus of scholars worldwide, initiated by Berle and Means’s research in this field following the Great 
Depression (Berle & Means, 1932) and continuing beyond Jensen and Meckling formally discussing the relationship 
between the two concepts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Even when considering the subsequent decades’ exploration, 
no generally accepted conclusion has yet been reached. Some researchers (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConnell 
& Servaes, 1990; Pedemen & Thomsen, 1999) hold that ownership structure has an effect on corporate performance, 
but still many studies (e.g. Domsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Wahla, Shah, & Hussain, 
2012) fail to find a relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. Chinese scholars (e.g. Bai, 
Liu, Lu, Song, & Zhang, 2005; Chen & Xu, 2001; Liu & Wang, 2000; Sun & Huang, 1999; Tan, He, & Ma, 2011) 
have also conducted extensive research on this subject, most of which is focused on companies that are listed on the 
main board and the SME board, since the GEM board is still considered a new development in China. As a result, 
conducting research on the GEM board became both important and urgent since it has already become an 
indispensable part of the Chinese multi-level capital market. 
 
This article attempted to answer the following two research questions to achieve the goal of the study: 
 
1) Is there a relationship between ownership structure and the corporate performance of companies listed 
on the GEM board? 
2) What is the specific relationship between different variables of ownership structure and corporate 
performance of companies listed on the GEM board? 
 
2.1 Ownership Mix and Corporate Performance 
 
Ownership mix is concerned with the identity of a company’s major shareholder, who could have tradable shares, 
state-owned shares and legal-person shares considering the Chinese context (Xu & Wang, 1999). Furthermore, 
people at management level of companies listed on the GEM board often hold majority shares, so it is necessary to 
take managerial shares into consideration as well. 
 
Theoretically, according to price signals of the stock market and takeover mechanisms, the stronger stock liquidity 
is, the more beneficial it is to risk diversification and the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate financing. 
However, in reality, as the Chinese capital market is not fully developed, most tradable shareholders are individual 
investors and their ownership is too dispersive and speculative to get involved in corporate governance. Free-rider 
problems frequently occur among minority shareholders. Thus, the high proportion of tradable shares may have a 
negative effect on corporate governance rather than making corporate governance more efficient (Chen & Xu, 2001; 
Xu & Hu, 2006). In addition, a high proportion of tradable shares is likely to disperse decision-makers’ control, 
which is not beneficial to informed decision-making (Du & Liu, 2002). 
 
With their strong political character and political agendas, state-owned shares, on the one hand, will lead to a more 
complicated agency relationship and higher agency cost (Du & Liu, 2002) so that managers can take advantage of 
weak control of ownership to achieve insider control. Xu and Wang (1999) report that the more state-owned shares 
exist, the worse corporate performance is (see also Wang & Xu, 2009; Yan, 2009). However, it cannot be denied 
that state-owned shares have a positive side, and some scholars suggest that the participation of state-owned shares 
can bring extra welfare to companies (Liu, 2004; Liu, Huang, Tse, & He, 2011). On the other hand, unnecessary 
intervention has a negative influence on operators’ autonomy so their enthusiasm is weakened. As for companies on 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March/April 2016 Volume 15, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 29 The Clute Institute 
the GEM board, which are innovation-oriented, there is no doubt that state-owned shareholders’ involvement will 
affect the decision-making and innovation of operators, which will have adverse effects on listed companies. 
 
There are obvious advantages for legal-person shareholders. Compared with individual shareholders, legal-person 
shareholders are equipped with more professional knowledge, abundant experience and better developed 
information channels (Su & He, 2012), so that the free-rider problem can be avoided to some extent. Compared with 
state-owned shareholders, legal-person shareholders have no political pressure and agendas and can perform better 
with corporate supervision and management (Su & He, 2012). Prior research (e.g. Liu, Huang, Tse, & He, 2011; Yu, 
2001) reports positive comments regarding the relationship between legal-person shares and corporate performance. 
Scholars believe legal-person shareholders have good self-control and are stable – their controllable investment 
motivation not only results in their active involvement, but the incentive to conduct corporate supervision to 
improve governance efficiency, and the stability of their shareholding results in long-term operational behavior, 
which is beneficial to a company’s development (Liu, 2000; Liu, Huang, Tse, & He, 2011; Zhang, 2000). 
 
At present, more and more enterprises encourage management to participate in corporate governance, like 
shareholders, by means of stock incentives, which can contribute to Management’s interests being entwined with 
those of shareholders (Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Li & Wu, 2010). Hence, the 
adverse selection of corporate performance resulting from conflicts of interests between management and 
shareholders can be avoided to some extent. The results of existing research on the role top management played in 
corporate performance remains inconclusive. As for the current situation in China, some professional managers have 
problems regarding their fiduciary duty, and when management holds low levels of shareholding, their objectives 
still will not keep in line with corporate interest (Guglar, Mueller, & Yurtoglu, 2004). A high level of managerial 
shareholding, in contrast, will make it more possible for managers to expropriate corporate interest (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Switzer, 2007; Wang & Xu, 2009). Due to moral deficiency and a lack of effective supervision, managers 
with shares may sacrifice other shareholders’ interest for their own. Thus, managerial shares in listed companies on 
the GEM board may lead to tunneling behavior instead of positive convergence, that is, the higher the proportion of 
managerial shares, the more opportunities managers have to abuse power for personal gain and to damage corporate 
performance (Xu & Wang, 2000). 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, the following hypotheses were developed for the current study: 
 
H1.1: The ratio of tradable shares has a negative correlation with corporate performance 
 
H1.2: The ratio of state-owned shares has a negative correlation with corporate performance 
 
H1.3: The ratio of legal-person shares has a positive correlation with corporate performance 
 
H1.4: The ratio of managerial shares has a negative correlation with corporate performance 
 
2.2 Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance 
 
Currently, there is no generally accepted conclusion about the effects of ownership concentration or ownership 
separation on corporate performance. Some research reports that there is no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance (Fernandez & Gomez, 2002; Liu, 2004; Yu, 2001). In contrast, 
several scholars (e.g. Gorton & Schmid, 2000; Wang & Xu, 2009) point out that ownership concentration is 
beneficial to corporate performance. Those enterprises with high ownership concentration usually have higher 
profits than those with diffused ownership (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), and shareholders with a larger shareholding 
proportion are more capable and motivated to pursue corporate value maximization. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
find that ownership concentration has a positive correlation with both shareholder wealth and corporate profit. Sun 
and Huang (1999) observe the important contribution to corporate governance that would result from reasonable 
ownership concentration and the presence of relatively controlling shareholders. Zhang (2000) suggests that there is 
a significant positive correlation between reasonable ownership concentration and corporate performance by 
studying the relationship between the top five largest shareholders and corporate performance. This is supported by 
Liu and Gao (2007) and Chen and Chen (2011). In addition, existing research (Lins & Servaes, 2002; Xu & Zhang, 
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2008) shows that the degree of ownership balance is related to corporate performance and the higher the degree of 
balance, the more restrictions other shareholders can put on the largest shareholder, improving corporate 
performance to some extent. 
 
Currently, there are three main measurements of ownership concentration: the CR index determines the cumulative 
percentage of shares held by the top N largest shareholders, while the Herfindahl index measures the sum of squared 
percentages of shares held by the top N largest shareholders. A third measure, the Z index, is a measurement of the 
degree of balance: the higher the Z index, the more the largest shareholder gets restricted by smaller shareholders. 
The current study used the CR index as a measurement of the degree of concentration, measuring both the share 
proportion of the largest shareholder (CR1) and the cumulative shareholding of the top ten largest shareholders 
(CR10). The study also adopted the Z index to represent the cumulative proportion of shares held by the second-
largest to tenth-largest shareholders, relative to the shareholding of the largest shareholder. 
 
Based on the analysis above, the study formulated the following hypotheses: 
 
H2.1:	 The CR1 index has a negative correlation with corporate performance 
 
H2.2: The CR10 index has a positive correlation with corporate performance 
 
H2.3: The Z index has a positive correlation with corporate performance 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The hypotheses developed in the previous section are used to analyze the relationship between ownership structure 
and corporate performance. In order to test the hypotheses, eight models are established and balanced panel data is 
employed. In this part of the study, details about the data are provided and the six models used to assess the relevant 
relationships are introduced. 
 
3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
 
The sample consisted of 153 companies, which were listed on the GEM board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange that 
went public during 2009 and 2010. The data for these companies for the three-year period 2010–2012 was extracted 
from the CSMAR database. Hence, the data used in the current study can be defined as “secondary data”. A 
balanced panel data methodology was applied to analyze the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance, with 153 companies and 459 observations included in the statistical models used for analysis. 
 
3.2 Variable Definition 
 
The variables in this study consisted of corporate performance variables, ownership structure variables and control 
variables. The definitions of the variables are provided below: 
 
(1) Corporate performance. Common measurements used in previous research (e.g. Brown & Caylor, 
2009; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Xu & Zhang, 2008) included 
Tobin’s Q ratio, which is problematic to estimate, and return on equity (ROE), which is often 
influenced by earnings management. In an attempt to address these limitations, ROA was employed in 
the current study as the proxy for corporate performance. 
(2) Ownership structure. As mentioned above, the measurement of ownership structure reflects ownership 
mix and ownership concentration. Ownership mix reflects the portion of tradable shares, state-owned 
shares, legal-person shares and managerial shares. Ownership concentration is measured by the CR1, 
CR10 and Z indices. 
(3) Control variables. The current study included an industry variable, company size variable and debt to 
asset ratio variable as control variables. 
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Table1 below provides the definitions of these variables. 
 
Table 1. Definition of variables 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variable  
Return on assets (ROA) net income/average total assets 
Independent Variables  
Ratio of tradable shares (TS) tradable shares/total shares 
Ratio of state-owned shares (SS) state-owned shares/total shares 
Ratio of legal-person shares (LS) legal-person shares/total shares 
Ratio of managerial shares (MS) managerial shares/total shares 
Ratio of the largest shareholder (CR1) shares of the largest shareholder/total shares 
Ratio of top ten largest shareholders (CR10) shares of top ten largest shareholders/total shares 
Ratio of second to tenth largest shareholders to the largest 
shareholder (Z) 
cumulative shares of second to tenth-largest shareholders / 
shares of the largest shareholder 
Control Variables  
Industry (INDUS) manufacturing industry=1, others=0 
Company size (SIZE) log(total assets) 
Debt to asset ratio (DA) total debt/total assets 
 
3.3 Model Design  
 
According to the hypotheses above, the current study proposed the following regression model (1): 
 ROA$% = 	   α) + β,TS$% + β/SS$% + β0LS$% + β2MS$% + β4CR1$% + β7CR10$% + β9Z$%	  +β;INDUS$% + β@SIZE$% + β,)DA$% + ε$%  (1) 
 
Where: 
 
ROA refers to corporate performance, ownership mix is represented by TS, SS, LS and MS, ownership 
concentration is represented by CR1, CR10 and Z, and INDUS, SIZE and DA represent control variables. α) is the 
intercept, β, −	  β,, are regression coefficients, ε$% is the error term, and i and t represent listed company i and year t, 
respectively. Model (1) was used to examine whether there is a linear relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate performance. 
 
In addition, since many scholars point out that there is a quadratic nonlinear relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate performance (Bai et al., 2005; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Wu, 2002; Zhang & Zhang, 
2004), the current study also used models (2) to (6) to examine whether there is a quadratic nonlinear relationship 
between the ownership structure of companies listed on the GEM board and their corporate performance by 
incorporating CR1×CR1, TS×TS, SS×SS, LS×LS and MS×MS. 
 ROA$% = 	   α) + β,TS$% + β/SS$% + β0LS$% + β2MS$% + β4CR1$% + β7CR10$% + β9Z$%	  +β;(CR1$%×CR1$%) + β@INDUS$% + β,)SIZE$% + β,,DA$% + ε$%     (2) 
 ROA$% = α) + β,TS$% + β/SS$% + β0LS$% + β2MS$% + β4CR1$% + β7CR10$% + β9Z$%	  +β;(TS$%×TS$%) + β@INDUS$% + β,)SIZE$% + β,,DA$% + ε$%     (3) 
 ROA$% = α) + β,TS$% + β/SS$% + β0LS$% + β2MS$% + β4CR1$% + β7CR10$% + β9Z$%	  +β;(SS$%×SS$%) + β@INDUS$% + β,)SIZE$% + β,,DA$% + ε$%     (4) 
 ROA$% = α) + β,TS$% + β/SS$% + β0LS$% + β2MS$% + β4CR1$% + β7CR10$% + β9Z$%	  +β;(LS$%×LS$%) + β@INDUS$% + β,)SIZE$% + β,,DA$% + ε$%     (5) ROA$% = α) + β,TS$% + β/SS$% + β0LS$% + β2MS$% + β4CR1$% + β7CR10$% + β9Z$%	  +β;(MS$%×MS$%) + β@INDUS$% + β,)SIZE$% + β,,DA$% + ε$%     (6) 
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4. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The study used the cross-sectional data of 153 companies listed on the GEM board for the period 2010 to 2012 for 
the descriptive analysis, and panel methodology to conduct regression analyses using Eviews 6.0 to estimate the 
models. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Min. Max. Mean Std.Dev 
ROA 459 -0.3685 0.2732 0.0675 0.0470 
TS 459 0.1000 0.8720 0.3804 0.1338 
SS 459 0.0000 0.7220 0.0313 0.1058 
LS 459 0.0000 0.8000 0.1808 0.2239 
MS 459 0.0000 0.8973 0.3748 0.2202 
CR1 459 0.0877 0.6517 0.3355 0.1276 
CR10 459 0.4008 0.9140 0.6801 0.0930 
Z 459 0.0396 5.6864 1.3385 0.9763 
INDUS 459 0.0000 1.0000 0.6600 0.4760 
SIZE 459 19.6570 22.3830 20.8340 0.5422 
DA 459 0.0126 0.7641 0.1730 0.1323 
 
From Table 2, we know that: 
 
•   Firstly, for corporate performance, the average ROA is about 6.7%, indicating that companies listed on the 
GEM board report profitable overall performance. The large gap between minimum and maximum ROA 
values, however, shows the unbalanced development among the companies. 
•   Secondly, for ownership mix, Table 2 demonstrates that the float ratio of listed companies on the GEM 
board is about 38%, reflecting the low liquidity of stocks. The proportion of state-owned shares is about 
3%, indicating the low engagement of state-owned shares in listed companies. The proportion of legal-
person shares is not large and is about 18%. However, the mean value of managerial shares in listed 
companies is about 37%, which is larger than the participation found on the main board and the SME board 
(Hu & Jiang, 2004; Li & Wu, 2010; Lin, Xu, & Tang, 2009; Tan, He, & Ma, 2011). Thus, we concluded 
that having a high proportion of managerial shares is the prominent characteristic of Chinese companies 
listed on the GEM board. 
•   Lastly, for ownership concentration, the mean of the CR1 index is about 33%. This value is lower than the 
average of companies listed on the main board and similar to the index for companies listed on the SME 
board (Kong & Wang, 2003; She & Hu, 2007; Wang & Xu, 2009; Zhang & Fang, 2009). The mean also 
indicates that the largest shareholder has a relative advantage in terms of the ratio of shareholding 
compared with other shareholders in the company. In addition, the largest shareholder has an absolute 
control position in 15% and a relative control position in 72% of the companies (taking a shareholding ratio 
≥ 20% as criterion for relative control). Considering the ownership balance degree, the Z index of more 
than half the enterprises is larger than one, that is, the cumulative shareholding of the second-largest to the 
tenth-largest shareholders present a significant check and balance on the largest shareholder. 
  
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March/April 2016 Volume 15, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 33 The Clute Institute 
Table 3. Regression of Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance (ROA) 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
C -2.9017
*** 0.6091 -2.9350
*** 0.6530 -2.9131
*** 0.6030 (-4.7637) (-4.4855) (-4.8319) 
TS -0.1412
*** 0.0247 -0.1411
*** 
0.0247 -0.3549
*** 0.0912 (-5.7260) (-5.7082) (-3.8921) 
SS -0.2279
** 0.0950 -0.2288
** 0.0967 -0.2055
** 0.0944 (-2.4004) (-2.3995) (-2.1757) 
LS -0.0366 0.0262 -0.0368 0.0263 -0.0298 0.0261 (-1.3966) (-1.3986) (-1.1410) 
MS -0.0649
** 0.0320 -0.0650
** 0.0320 -0.0537
* 0.0320 (-2.0302) (-2.0287) (-1.6801) 
CR1 -0.3724 0.6909 -0.1502 2.2652 -0.2614 0.6853 (-0.5391) (-0.0875) (-0.3815) 
CR10 0.1779
*** 0.0571 0.1781
*** 0.0577 0.1675
*** 0.0567 (3.1170) (3.1126) (2.9574) 
Z10 -0.0236 0.0176 -0.0233 0.0181 -0.0182 0.0176 (-1.3388) (-1.3091) (-1.0375) 
CR1×CR1   -0.3110 3.4129   (-0.1415) 
TS×TS     0.2839
** 0.1167 (2.4319) 
SS×SS       
LS×LS       
MS×MS       
SIZE 0.1521
*** 0.0288 0.1520
*** 0.0289 0.1523
*** 0.0285 (5.2787) (5.2637) (5.3396) 
DA -0.4080
*** 0.0640 -0.4083
*** 0.0640 -0.4017
*** 0.0634 (-6.3761) (-6.3638) (-6.3359) 
INDUS Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.5440 0.5420 0.5533 
F-value 3.9303*** 3.8901*** 4.0238*** 
D-W 2.2266 2.2293 2.2113 
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(Table 3 continued) 
Variables Model(4) Model(5) Model(6) Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
C -2.8803*** 0.6100 -2.8866*** 0.6108 -2.9355*** 0.6103 (-4.7215) (-4.7256) (-4.8099) 
TS -0.1424*** 0.0247 -0.1411*** 0.0247 -0.1406*** 0.0247 (-5.7597) (-5.7120) (-5.6967) 
SS -0.3241** 0.1488 -0.2312** 0.0953 -0.2329** 0.0951 (-2.1775) (-2.4252) (-2.4481) 
LS -0.0369 0.0262 -0.0202 0.0422 -0.0364 0.0262 (-1.4054) (-0.4789) (-1.3869) 
MS -0.0645** 0.0320 -0.0658* 0.0321 0.0342 (0.3120) 0.1097 (-2.0161) (-2.0497) 
CR1 -0.4062 0.6925 -0.4235 0.6996 -0.3601 0.6911 (-0.5866) (-0.6053) (-0.5211) 
CR10 0.1765*** 0.0571 0.1763*** 0.0573 0.1773*** 0.0571 (3.0896) (3.0780) (3.1060) 
Z10 -0.0237 0.0176 -0.0236 0.0176 -0.0236 0.0176 (-1.3469) (-1.3406) (-1.3395) 
CR1×CR1       
TS×TS       
SS×SS 0.4088 0.4871     (0.8392) 
LS×LS   -0.0244 0.0493   (-0.4960) 
MS×MS     -0.1273 0.1346 (-0.9452) 
SIZE 0.1515*** 0.0288 0.1522*** 0.0289 0.1529*** 0.0288 
(5.2562) (5.2742) (5.3044) 
DA -0.4076*** 0.0640 -0.4080*** 0.0641 -0.4101*** 0.0640 (-6.3656) (-6.3665) (-6.4035) 
INDUS Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.5434 0.5425 0.5437 
F-value 3.9056*** 3.8952*** 3.9099*** 
D-W 2.2213 2.2273 2.2272 
Notes: The F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test for random effects both rejected the null hypothesis, and hence a fixed effect model is 
chosen for the study. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, we observed that the debt ratio of companies listed on the GEM board is relatively low at a level of 
about 17%, which indicates that these companies mainly depend on equity capital and internal financing. The low 
debt ratio could also reveal that small and medium-sized enterprises are facing financing constraint to some extent. 
 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
 
We used Eviews 6.0 to conduct an overall regression on models (1) to (6)4. The results are presented in Table 3. In 
Table 3, we observe that the adjusted R2 of every model is about 0.55, which indicates that the models have a good 
degree of fit. The significance of the F-values reported also shows good effectiveness of the regression overall for all 
models. In the models above, the relationship between ownership structure and the ROA of companies listed on the 
GEM board is significant. Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson (D-W) values for the models are all around 2.2 
(relatively close to 2.0), indicating that there is no serious autocorrelation. Based on the regression results in Table 3, 
the following extended analysis of model (1) to model (6) are provided: 
 
                                                
4 The panel data methodology employed in the study contributes to eliminating potential multicollinearity problems. Furthermore, correlation 
analyses executed before conducting the multiple regression analyses indicated that most cross-correlation for the independent variables is low 
(<0.4) and that for CR1, CR10 and Z it is relatively high but still less than 0.8, which reduced concerns about potential multicollinearity problems 
in the study. 
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4.2.1 Ownership Mix and Corporate Performance 
 
From model (1), we can deduce that the proportion of tradable shares, state-owned shares and managerial shares has 
a significant correlation with corporate performance, while the proportion of legal-person shares is not significant. 
According to model (3) to model (6), the nonlinear relationship between ownership mix and corporate performance 
is not significant except for the tradable shares, which has a quadratic nonlinear relationship with corporate 
governance. 
 
Firstly, the proportion of tradable shares has a negative correlation with corporate performance at a 1% significance 
level, so hypothesis 1.1 is not rejected. At the same time, there is a quadratic nonlinear relationship between tradable 
shares and corporate performance, showing that we should not generalize the relationship between tradable shares 
and corporate performance while there is a reasonable interval. 
 
Secondly, the proportion of state-owned shares has a negative correlation with corporate performance at a 5% 
significance level, so hypothesis 1.2 is not rejected. From the analysis above, we can conclude that the participation 
of state-owned shares may result in low management efficiency and is therefore not beneficial to the improvement 
of corporate performance. The conclusion, however, may have something to do with the general low proportion of 
state-owned shares of companies listed on the GEM board. 
 
Thirdly, the proportion of managerial shares has a negative correlation with corporate performance at a 5% 
significance level, so hypothesis 1.4 is not rejected. There is a high proportion of managerial shares in companies 
listed on the GEM board. However, when the proportion has reached a certain level, the equity incentive behavior 
accelerates management to pursue corporate control instead, and at that point, a high managerial shares proportion is 
not beneficial to corporate governance, but could also affect corporate performance negatively. 
 
Lastly, the proportion of legal-person shares has a negative correlation with corporate performance, so hypothesis 
1.3 is rejected although the correlation is not statistically significant. From the analyses presented above, we know 
that legal-person shares have multipartite advantages compared with individual shares and state-owned shares. 
However, because the ultimate goal of legal-person shareholders is to maximize their own personal profit, it is 
inevitable for legal-person shareholders to sacrifice company interest for their own benefit. Moreover, the irregular 
operation, related party transaction and internal transaction would cause harm to market fairness and fair 
competition. All of these would cause unsatisfactory corporate performance. 
 
4.2.2 Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance 
 
According to model (1) and model (2) in Table 3, the shareholding proportion of the top 10 largest shareholders has 
a significant positive correlation with corporate performance at a 1% significance level. There is no significant linear 
relation or U-shape relation between the largest shareholder and corporate performance. Furthermore, the effect of 
the Z index on corporate performance is found not to be significant. An extended analysis of ownership 
concentration and corporate performance is provided below: 
 
Firstly, we can observe that there is a negative but insignificant correlation between the shareholding proportion of 
the largest shareholder and corporate performance, so hypothesis 2.1 can be supported to some extent. A potential 
reason why the relationship is not significant could be that the more equity the largest shareholder holds, the less 
counterbalancing this shareholder will experience in decision-making and behavior. This lack of counterbalancing 
can easily lead to decision-making error and could damage minority shareholders’ interest, eventually harming the 
company’s development. 
 
Secondly, the shareholding proportion of the top 10 largest shareholders has a significant positive correlation with 
corporate performance, so hypothesis 2.2 is not rejected. This result indicates that certain forms of ownership 
concentration can avoid self-interested behavior to a certain degree and improves the accuracy and efficiency of 
decision-making in order to improve corporate performance. 
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Lastly, the Z index has a negative correlation with corporate performance, so hypothesis 2.3 is rejected. The result 
shows that the counterbalancing of the largest shareholder does not benefit the improvement of corporate 
performance. The largest shareholder in companies listed on the GEM board may have extensive experience and a 
broad network, and have a dominant position in companies. Excessive counterbalance by the other large 
shareholders will influence the correctness and efficiency of the largest shareholder’s decision-making, and his or 
her role to play, which is not favorable to company development. 
 
Meanwhile, except for the industry variable, the other two control variables both have a significant correlation with 
corporate performance. Company size has a positive correlation with corporate performance, while the debt ratio 
exhibits a negative correlation with corporate performance. 
 
4.2.3 The Endogeneity of Ownership Structure 
 
Previous studies have shown that no serious endogeneity problem with regard to ownership structure is observed for 
Chinese companies (Cai & Gao, 2010; Song, Zhang, & Li, 2004). The current study used model (7) below to verify 
whether an endogeneity problem was detected for the companies included in this study. 
 STO$% = α) + β,ROA$% + β/INDUS$% + β0SIZE$% + β2DA$% + ε$%    (7) 
 
Where: 
 
STO refers to variables of ownership structure. Owning to the space limitation, detailed results are not displayed 
here. The results, however, indicate that as a dependent variable, corporate performance has no significant 
relationship with ownership structure, that is, the endogeneity problem of ownership structure is not significant for 
companies listed on the GEM board. 
 
4.2.4 Robustness Test 
 
Model (8) below was constructed to test robustness by replacing ROA with return on equity (ROE) in model (1). 
The regression result is displayed in Table 4. 
 𝑅𝑂𝐸$% = 	   α) + β,TS$% + β/SSJK + β0LS$% + β2MS$% + β4CR1$% + β7CR10$% + β9Z$%	  +β;INDUS$% + β@SIZE$% + β,)DA$% + ε$%  (8) 
 
Table 4. Regression of Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance (ROE) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error T-value 
C -4.6735*** 0.7533 -6.2041 
TS -0.1987*** 0.0305 -6.5130 
SS -0.1800 0.1174 -1.5329 
LS -0.0213 0.0324 -0.6572 
MS -0.0664* 0.0396 -1.6775 
CR1 -0.3922 0.8544 -0.4591 
CR10 0.1598** 0.0706 2.2645 
Z -0.0288 0.0218 -1.3254 
INDUS -0.0373 0.0244 -1.5267 
SIZE 0.2420*** 0.0356 6.7947 
DA -0.5175*** 0.0791 -6.5388 
Adj. R2 0.4818 
F-value 3.5841*** 
D-W  2.3284 
Notes: The F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test for random effects both rejected the null hypothesis, and hence a fixed effect model is 
chosen for the study. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
In Table 4, tradable shares have a significant correlation with corporate performance at a 1% significance level. 
Managerial shares have a weak correlation with corporate performance at a 10% significance level, while the results 
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provide no support for state-owned shares and legal-person shares. As for ownership concentration, the shareholding 
proportion of the top 10 largest shareholders has a positive correlation with corporate performance at a 5% 
significance level, while the shareholding proportion of the largest shareholder and the Z index are not significant. 
The regression results of model (8) are similar to model (1), which indicates the robustness of the relationship 
between ownership structure and financial performance in the context of the Chinese GEM board for different 
estimations of performance. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
Taking 153 companies listed on the GEM board as research objects, the study reported here studied the relationship 
between ownership structure and corporate performance with the empirical analysis of data from 2010 to 2012. Our 
findings show that the proportion of state-owned shares and managerial shares has a negative correlation with 
corporate performance, that is, the higher these ownership proportions are, the worse the corporate performance 
becomes. In addition, tradable shares have a quadratic nonlinear correlation with corporate performance, and the 
relationship between legal-person shares and corporate performance is not significant. As for the relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance, we found that only the share proportion of the top 10 
largest shareholders has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance, while the relationships 
between the share proportion of the largest shareholder and corporate performance, and those between the Z index 
and corporate performance, are not significant. Based on these conclusions, some suggestions for the development 
of listed companies on the GEM board are provided below. 
 
Firstly, institutional investors should be introduced. Presently, the majority of the tradable shareholders in China are 
individual investors, with the small and scattered characteristics of individual investors leading to their speculative 
behavior. Compared with individual investors, institutional investors have abundant capital, professional teams and 
more information channels, so their investing behavior is more rational and their investment cycle is more stable, 
which enables institutional investors to be both capable and motivated to monitor the companies they are investing 
in. Institutional investors’ involvement could also impel companies listed on the GEM board to optimize ownership 
structure and to improve corporate performance, should contribute to the stable and efficient operation of the GEM 
board and capital market. 
 
Secondly, managerial shares should be allocated prudently. According to the results, it is obvious that managerial 
shares have a significant negative correlation with corporate performance. Listed companies should therefore treat 
stock incentives to management-level employees seriously. At the same time, companies need to build sound 
supervision mechanisms, aiming at effectively avoiding the negative effects associated with managerial shares. 
 
Lastly, an appropriate ownership concentration and degree of balance for majority shareholders should be 
maintained. From the results, we can learn that companies should keep the proportion of majority shareholders in 
control to avoid individual extreme behavior and the domination of a single shareholder, to protect the interest of 
minority shareholders. Meanwhile, companies should optimize the proportion of shareholders to let ownership 
concentration be kept at an appropriate level so that the largest shareholder can play his or her role. 
 
In addition, companies listed on the GEM board should take expanding their size and maintaining an appropriate 
debt ratio into consideration to promote their performance. 
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